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Managerial Hubris, Trade-Associations, and Regulatory 
Knowledge in Micro-Firms 
Abstract 
To avoid breaking the law for regulatory non-compliance it is essential that 
micro-firm owner-managers are aware of deficiencies in their knowledge, so they 
can seek improvement, and avoid over-confidence (i.e. hubris) in their knowledge 
levels.  Using newly collected survey data from micro-firms in the English 
accommodation sector and multivariate techniques, we explore the possibility of 
hubris by making a novel distinction between the Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge of regulation held by micro-firm owner-managers. Both Perceived-
Knowledge (from self-assessment) and Actual-Knowledge (from a simple test) 
over four core areas of regulation are found to be different, generally poor, and 
suggestive of hubris. The relationship between these knowledge levels is further 
explored by considering the role of trade-association membership (since they 
support members) and attitude (since it effects learning).  Attitude is found to be 
positively associated with both forms of knowledge, while trade-association 
memberships are also found to be associated with enhanced Perceived-, but not 
Actual-Knowledge.  In light of our results we suggest several priority areas for 
improving Actual-Knowledge and self-assessment skills, and areas for future 
research. 
 
Keywords: Micro-Firms, Regulation, Perceived-Knowledge, Actual-Knowledge, Trade-
associations, Self-Assessment. 
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1. Introduction 
Managers of all businesses must make decisions based on their knowledge and understanding 
of an ever-evolving set of regulations1. However, in small firms and particularly micro-firms, 
the wide range of responsibilities and potential lack of skills or specialist knowledge may 
impact managers’ knowledge and understanding of the applicability of particular regulations, 
and/or the detail of how they should be implemented (O'Dwyer and Ryan, 2000). For a business 
to succeed it needs to comply with all applicable regulations, whilst expending the least amount 
of resources in doing so. A poor level of understanding of regulations can result in misguided 
attempts at regulatory compliance, which risks incurring unnecessary costs and/or prosecution 
for breaking the law. For smaller firms, the resulting fines, reputational damage, and/or loss of 
business due to temporary closure can quickly exceed their limited resources (Boustras et al., 
2015; Shalini, 2009). It is therefore important to understand what managers’ know and how 
much they think they know about the regulations applying to their business, and the sources of 
this Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge.  
A potential danger is managers are liable to exhibit hubris (i.e. inappropriate overconfidence), 
meaning that they mistakenly believe their knowledge to be more accurate and complete than 
it truly is, thereby leading to ill-informed decision-making and unintentional non-compliance. 
There is a rich literature exploring managerial hubris in a variety of contexts, including 
entrepreneurship, unethical governance, and the decisions taken by corporate executives 
(Cassar, 2010; Haynes et al., 2015; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Hayward et al., 2006; Hiller 
and Hambrick, 2005; Judge et al., 2009; McManus, 2016)2. This literature suggests that hubris 
                                                 
1 Regulation is the “imposition of rules by government, backed by the use of penalties that are intended specifically 
to modify the economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector” OECD (1993, p.73).  
2 See Table 1 in Bodolica and Spraggon (2011) for an overview of hubris and its manifestations in managers/firms. 
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is a real concern for businesses and it is likely to be especially serious for micro-firms who lack 
the resources to withstand poor decision-making for a prolonged period. Typically, studies on 
regulation, particularly those involving micro-firms, assess the ‘burden’ of regulation but 
crucially fail to explore the level of knowledge and understanding that sits behind the assumed 
burden (Kitching, 2006; Kitching et al., 2015). Furthermore, micro-firms are frequently 
overlooked in favour of larger ‘small firms’, while firms with no employees are often excluded, 
both in general terms, and in academic studies of regulation in particular (Arrowsmith et al., 
2003; Greenbank, 2000; Russo and Tencati, 2009). Yet knowledge-of, and compliance-with, 
regulation is especially significant for micro-firms as managers often find themselves spread 
thinly, focusing on the day-to-day operations of their businesses (and hence ‘firefighting’) 
rather than finding time for business development (Falta and Gallery, 2011). They are also 
likely to suffer from a lack of managerial skill and experience, and wider business support 
(Carson, 1985; Johnson, 2002; O'Dwyer and Ryan, 2000) making them particularly vulnerable 
to hubris. For instance, Blackburn et al. (2015) find micro-firm managers often 'sort out 
problems on their own' and only 20% seek legal professionals when dealing with legal issues, 
despite lacking the expertise themselves. This makes micro-firms an ideal setting in which to 
explore regulatory knowledge, especially since they are also the most numerous type of 
businesses in the UK economy, accounting for 96% of all businesses, 32% of private sector 
employment, and 19% of private sector turnover (BEIS, 2016a).  
The contributions of this paper are three-fold.  First, a novel distinction is made between the 
Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge of regulation held by micro-firm owner-managers.  This 
explores the idea that owner-managers might not know as much as they think they know, and 
hence allows for an investigation of hubristic behaviour.   The second contribution expands on 
this by exploring the relationship between trade-associations membership and levels of 
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Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, since these organisations provide their member firms with 
support in this area.  The final contribution takes this further by examining the association 
between attitudes towards regulation and the levels of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, since 
attitude impacts an individual’s approach to learning. 
Throughout the paper explores the theoretical positions developed using original survey data 
of the English tourism industry and multivariate techniques. Four core areas of regulation are 
explored as they are areas where the relevant trade-associations are active and are widely 
applicable to most businesses, thereby broadening the potential impact of the results beyond 
the immediate case.  The tourism industry is a fitting case for such a study as it predominantly 
comprises micro-firms (Tourism Alliance, 2016) and  is highly regulated, with over 21,000 
regulations estimated to be in effect (Tourism Regulation Taskforce, 2012). It is a significant 
sector in the UK economy, accounting for 9.5% of UK employment and contributing 7.1% of 
UK GDP (in 2014) (Tourism Alliance, 2016). Furthermore, Shaw and Williams (2009) argue 
there is little research into knowledge in a tourism context, and there are a substantial number 
of trade-associations in the industry (with high levels of membership) making it an ideal 
context in which to explore the issue of regulatory knowledge within micro-firms. 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
therein developing a number of hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents background on the 
chosen case, details of the survey that acted as the data source, and the methodological 
approach. Sections 4 and 5 then present, analyse, and discuss the results, before Section 6 
briefly concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Micro-Firms and Regulation  
Micro-firms, defined herein as firms with 0-9 employees (BIS, 2016c; DTI, 1995), are 
distinguished by the role of the owner, who is likely to be both the manager and also highly 
active in all parts of the business (Edwards et al., 2002; Kelliher and Reinl, 2009). Unlike in 
larger (small) firms where there may be specialist support within the business, micro-firm 
owner-managers must not only be the chief decision-maker, but also a specialist in many 
(perhaps all) aspects of the business including regulation (Lovatt and Pratten, 2003; Matlay, 
1999; Tilley, 2000). With the owner-manager’s time stretched across all aspects of the 
business, there may be scarce opportunity to research and implement applicable regulations, 
potentially leading owner-managers to view regulation as a distraction from core business 
activities or to perhaps even ignore them (Akinboade and Kinfack, 2012; Atherton et al., 2008; 
Edwards et al., 2004). Micro-firms are generally found to be informal in their operations, with 
business practices which do not strictly follow regulatory procedures (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; 
Ram et al., 2001; Saridakis et al., 2013). It might therefore be supposed that knowledge of 
applicable regulations, and the associated challenges of ensuring compliance, are particularly 
problematic for micro-firms. However, the actual impact of regulation on micro-firms is 
unclear since most studies in this area have either tended to consider them to be part of a broad 
small or SME (Small and Medium Enterprise) segment (e.g. Crain and Crain, 2010) or exclude 
(at least some of) them from analysis (Achtenhagen et al., 2017; BEIS, 2016b; Blackburn and 
Hart, 2002; Falk and Hagsten, 2015; Falk et al., 2014; Granata et al., 2017; Hänninen et al., 
2017).  
Even when studies are relevant, they have been somewhat split in their conclusions making it 
difficult to establish a clear picture. Some studies have suggested small firms are indeed 
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disproportionately affected by regulation (e.g. Collard and Godwin, 1999; OECD, 2001). 
Indeed, Carter et al. (2009) identify a stream of work with such conclusions and suggest the 
basis of such regressive costs are because some compliance costs are (partially) fixed and hence 
do not increase in proportion to size. Other studies reach contrary conclusions (e.g. Edwards et 
al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008; Vickers et al., 2005). A review by Kitching (2006) found issues 
with identifying the direct impact of regulatory changes, although did suggest issues 
surrounding “lack of awareness of regulation [and] deliberate noncompliance” (p.803) might 
be responsible for such findings.  
Irrespective of the impact of regulation, owner-managers must continually maintain awareness 
of regulatory developments and then take appropriate action when necessary to preserve 
regulatory compliance. This fundamentally requires a suitable understanding of the regulations 
so they can be interpreted correctly. However, there is much evidence that small firm owners 
lack the solid knowledge and understanding of regulations required (Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; 
Harris et al., 2012; Lovatt and Pratten, 2003; Marlow, 2003; Sjögrén and Syrjä, 2015; Westrip, 
1986). These knowledge deficits might also impact upon the employees of the business, as 
many employees in small firms may lack awareness of relevant regulations or their own legal 
rights, instead relying upon the interpretations (correct or otherwise) of the owner-manager 
(Atkinson et al., 2016). For instance, Hart et al. (2008) found 67% of small business owners 
took personal responsibility when dealing with new regulation and 58% personally trained 
existing employees, further emphasising the need for owner-managers to have their own clear 
understanding. 
In light of these discussions it is clear knowledge of regulation is crucial for the success of 
micro-firms, but work on small firms suggest it is likely to be lacking. We can therefore specify: 
H1: Actual-Knowledge of regulation will be poor. 
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2.2 Knowledge, Self-Assessment, and Attitude 
Without a required qualification or formalised training programme for owner-managers of 
micro-firms, such individuals must assess their knowledge and then take action where it is 
thought to be lacking. Yet, most research (mainly in non-business contexts) reports that 
individuals are usually poor at assessing their own level of knowledge (Eva and Regehr, 2007, 
2011; Gordon, 1991; Kruger and Dunning, 1999, 2002; Meeran et al., 2016) suggesting that 
owner-manager hubris is a real possibility. Indeed, the review by Sitzmann et al. (2010) found 
56% of studies reported self-assessment to be inaccurate,  rising to 80% for the few studies on 
businesses. 
Businesses provide few opportunities for structured testing given (owner-)managers’ lack time 
(Johnson, 2002; Sauermann and Roach, 2013) and hence many studies simply accept self-
assessment to be an accurate proxy for Actual-Knowledge (Akinboade and Kinfack, 2012; 
Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Nag and Gioia, 2012; Weerasiri and Zhengang, 2012). However, 
Stokols et al. (2001) developed techniques with SMEs using Likert-scale type questions to 
ascertain the perceived level of managerial knowledge, before testing this with a series of 
questions. Similarly, Alaaeddine et al. (2013) tests SME knowledge with a bank of questions 
regarding different aspects of a new law.  
Given the paucity of research into the accuracy of self-assessment in a business context, most 
especially in a micro-firm and regulation context, along with the propensity for accepting self-
assessment despite apparent inaccuracies, we specify: 
H2: There will be little/no correlation between Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge of regulation. 
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Edwards et al. (2003) and Hart et al. (2008) both note how the perception of a regulation affects 
the way small firm owner-managers react to it, including their efforts at compliance. This is 
particularly evident when a regulation is viewed as an unwelcome intrusion or an erosion of 
perceived common sense. They also found that (when pressed) owners tended to consider all 
regulations equally. IpsosMORI (2007) also demonstrate the importance of owner perceptions 
or misperceptions through interviews, finding particularly negative perceptions of newer 
regulations, or regulatory changes, which diminished with time. It would therefore seem 
perceptions of regulation can impact the effort owner-managers put towards researching and 
implementing responses to regulation. We therefore specify: 
H3a: Perceived-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate with 
attitude towards regulation. 
H3b: Actual-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate with 
attitude towards regulation. 
 
2.3 Source of Knowledge 
To better understand the Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge of regulation owner-managers 
possess, it is important to recognise the sources of their knowledge. Existing research has 
identified a number of information sources used by micro/SME firms, such as the internet, 
personal networks, the media, external professionals (consultants, accountants, etc.), and trade-
associations (Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Bennett and Robson, 1999b; King et al., 2014; Peck 
et al., 2012). Although ‘the internet’ is frequently listed as a source, it is in fact a conduit to 
sources of knowledge including: definitive official sources such as Government websites; and 
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potentially unreliable sources such as blogs/news websites. Furthermore, whatever the source, 
the owner-manager needs to correctly interpret any information gathered, which is far from 
certain. For instance, Peck et al. (2012) highlight that relevant information can be lost amid 
‘media-noise’ and general negative opinion surrounding the reporting of regulatory matters.  
Several studies note the extensive use of external professionals, mostly accountants, by small 
firms for business support and information seeking (BEIS, 2016b; King et al., 2014; Pleasance 
and Balmer, 2013). However, the use of accountants may be over-reported as a source of wider 
support since the inherent complexities of financial matters, including payroll and taxation, 
make it difficult for owner-managers to ‘muddle-through’ hence support is often needed in this 
area. Indeed, there is limited research into what information and assistance owner-managers 
actually seek from their accountants beyond direct accounting matters, and it is unlikely 
accountants can provide robust support for wider regulatory matters (e.g. fire-safety 
requirements). Pleasance and Balmer (2013) found that while accountants were the most 
frequently used independent source of support in general, for regulatory matters, it is actually 
trade-associations that small firms turn towards. However, while much of the research into 
trade-associations investigates their lobbying role and/or their relationships with larger firms 
(Barnett, 2018; Bennett, 1998, 2000; Kahl, 2018; Lawton and Rajwani, 2018; Lawton et al., 
2018; Rajwani et al., 2015; Spillman, 2018), there is comparatively less into their role as a 
conduit for disseminating information among their members, or their relationship with smaller 
firms.  
Trade-associations can provide accurate and tailored information on relevant regulations given 
their inherent expertise  (and may also generate further benefits as they offer an extensive range 
of services, such as legal, financial, and marketing advice) (BEIS, 2016b; Bennett, 2011; 
Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Lawton et al., 2013; Tomlinson, 2012). As such trade-
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associations may contribute significantly towards the apparent shortfall of resources and 
capabilities which micro-firms often suffer due to their inherent size.  
Information and advice have both been identified as a specific reason for sustaining SME trade-
association membership (Bennett and Ramsden, 2007; Lawton et al., 2013). Indeed,  Battisti 
and Perry (2015) found that unlike larger firms, SMEs favoured access to individual advice 
over other services available. They also found improved awareness of industry issues and 
ability to cope with problems were among the strongest benefits that SMEs achieved through 
membership. In the context considered herein, potential mechanisms for knowledge 
enhancement include regular emails and/or magazines/books sent to members with detailed 
information on regulatory issues (see section 3.1 for more detail). It therefore seems likely 
trade-associations have a role in enhancing the regulatory knowledge of micro-firms, thereby 
offering an opportunity to explore our two-dimensional view of knowledge, and hence we 
specify: 
H4a: Membership of trade-associations will be positively associated 
with Perceived-Knowledge of regulation. 
H4b: Membership of trade-associations will be positively associated 
with Actual-Knowledge of regulation. 
 
However, sources of information on topics such as regulation are not in themselves enough, as 
Bennett and Robson (1999a) note SMEs have a greater need for assistance, but are less likely 
to seek it. As noted, owner-managers must appreciate the level of their knowledge in order to 
identify areas where they may be lacking. One mechanism which is often cited as improving 
knowledge self-assessment, is feedback (Krajc and Ortmann, 2008; Sitzmann et al., 2010). For 
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example, trade-associations may disseminate knowledge to their member firms through 
internal publications or email. This unidirectional knowledge transfer, an example of what 
Salge and Vera (2013) termed ‘radical learning’, lacks any form of feedback, thereby relying 
upon member firms (and owner-managers in particular) to both read and correctly interpret the 
information available. That is far from certain. As such, trade-association membership may 
well enhance Actual-Knowledge but might also engender hubris via an over-inflated sense of 
Perceived-Knowledge relative to the benefit actually provided. We therefore specify: 
H5: Membership of trade-associations has a greater positive 
association with Perceived-, rather than Actual-Knowledge. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Contextual Background 
To explore these issues, this study draws upon an original survey exploring regulation and 
micro-firms in the English holiday-accommodation industry. The focus is on England rather 
than the UK due to regulatory differences between the UK’s devolved regions. As mentioned 
in Section 1, the tourism industry is a suitable case to explore these themes as it not only 
accounts for a significant share of the economy, but is also predominantly made up of micro-
firms with a large number of regulations (Blackburn and Hart, 2002), the majority of which are 
noted to be “ill-fitted to the world of small businesses that characterise” the industry (House 
of Commons, 2015, p.3). Additionally, BEIS (2016b) found firms in the industry were most 
likely to claim regulation is an obstacle to success. Indeed, two of the trade-associations in the 
sector (The BBA and BedPosts) formed as a direct response to changing fire regulations (BBA, 
2014; BedPosts, 2014). 
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Within the English accommodation industry, the focus is on two main sub-sectors where micro-
firms are most likely to proliferate: serviced accommodation, such as Bed and Breakfasts 
(B&Bs) and hotels, of which there are an estimated 33,499 firms; and non-serviced 
accommodation, such as caravan parks and self-catering accommodation, of which there are 
an estimated 34,167 firms (VisitEngland, 2016). The sub-sectors not only define the services 
on offer, but also the regulations in place. For example, serviced firms are more likely to 
provide food and fall under food preparation regulation, while non-serviced firms are more 
likely to provide electricity and water to pitches, and hence are subject to related regulation.  
The industry is home to many trade-associations and marketing groups, such as the Bed and 
Breakfast Association (BBA), the British Hospitality Association (BHA), BedPosts, British 
Holiday & Home Parks Association (BH&HPA), and FarmStayUK. Each of which provide 
their members with support regarding business operations and crucially, dealing with 
regulation. For example: the BBA regularly email and distribute a monthly magazine to their 
8000 members (BBA, 2014); and the BH&HPA send a bi-monthly BH&HPA Journal to their 
2900+ membership which dedicates a significant proportion of its 100+ pages to regulatory 
matters (BH&HPA, 2017).  
In addition to these industry associations, there are many associations which operate across the 
wider tourism industry, such as VisitEngland, the national tourist board (who distribute their 
yearly Pink Book guide to accommodation regulation); and the Tourism Alliance, which 
operates as a ‘trade-association of trade-associations’ representing a combined 200,000+ 
tourism firms (Tourism Alliance, 2017). Furthermore, in the context of micro-firms, there is 
also significant overlap with associations such as the Federation of Small Businesses, who 
perform many of the same actions we have listed, but specialise in small business matters. 
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3.2 Sampling Frame and Survey Design 
A database of 3805 potential respondents was developed using several publicly available 
sources. These include the AA, bedandbreakfast.com, BedPosts, the Caravan Club, the ‘Little 
Green Book’, FarmStayUK, the Motorcaravanners Club Handbook, and UKParks.com. The 
sampling frame was limited to firms operating in England and to those with fewer than 10 
employees. The owners were contacted via post and/or email, addressed by name where known 
or ‘the owner’ where unknown, with several follow-ups over a six-month period from October 
2014. There were 706 valid responses, which represents a highly respectable 19% response 
rate, given the sampling frame (Saunders et al., 2015). 
The questions were first pilot tested by a subset of relevant potential respondents and the main 
industry associations (as outlined below) were approached with a draft of the survey to check 
the wording of the questions and to secure endorsements in the hope of enhancing response 
rates. A small number of minor changes were made in response to the feedback received from 
both sources, and the finalised survey was endorsed by the BBA, the BHA, and FarmStayUK; 
all of whom sent details of the study to their members. VisitEngland, the national tourist board, 
endorsed the study and included details in email and print publications. A further three groups 
(BedPosts, the National Caravan Council, and the Tourism Society) sent information about the 
study to their members without a formal endorsement. 
The survey explored owner-manager knowledge in four areas of regulation: employment; anti-
discrimination; fire; and health and safety. These areas were chosen because of their 
applicability not only within the tourism industry, but due to their wide reach and overall 
importance given they impact on almost all firms that either have employees or allow access 
to members of the public. Due to the restricted nature of the questions and the different micro-
firms being surveyed, respondents were only asked about regulatory areas relevant to their 
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business. The survey is part of a wider research project exploring regulation and micro-firms, 
and included additional questions which are not relevant to this study3. 
In addition, an unsolicited general comments box was included at the end of the survey. Present 
in 197 cases, these comments were analysed using constant-comparison thematic analysis 
(Krueger and Casey, 2009). The emergent themes, presented in the discussion of our results 
(Section 5, Table 8), offer further insight and support to our primary quantitative analyses.  
 
3.3 Analytical Approaches, Model Specification, and Variable Construction 
In light of the hypotheses developed in Section 2, we deploy two techniques to explore the 
relevant issues. The first group (H1-H3) require the exploration of the revealed levels of 
Perceived- and Actual-knowledge (including the respondents’ view of the value of regulation) 
which are most appropriately examined using summary statistics and bivariate correlations 
(Ward et al., 2002). The second group of hypotheses (H3-H5) explore the overall determinants 
of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge of regulation, using a formal model as specified below: 
 
The model is applied to both Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge as the dependent variable and 
incorporates a number of control variables (discussed below). Since both dependent variables 
are continuous and scalar, with the higher values clearly indicating owner-managers have more 
(actual or perceived) knowledge of regulation, an OLS regression model is adopted. This is 
                                                 
3 This paper is part of the PhD project of the leading author, which explores further themes, including the 
Perceived-Burden and Value of regulation, perceived industry compliance, and business performance. 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝐵0 +  𝐵1 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 +  𝐵2 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
+  𝐵3 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝐵4 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑
+  𝐵5 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝐵6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖  
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possible because, as Carifio and Perla (2008), Gaito (1980), and Dougherty (2011) identify, 
although the dependent variables incorporate several ordinal data sources (i.e. individual 
Likert-scale responses) they become interval results at the scale level due to their nature as 
combinations of responses to multiple questions. Furthermore, the central limit theorem 
suggests the resulting data will tend to be normally distributed and hence it is widely 
acknowledged that parametric techniques, such as OLS regression, are appropriate (Carifio and 
Perla, 2008; Dougherty, 2011; Norman, 2010)4. Indeed, not only do Blackburn and Hart (2002) 
utilise this method for combined test scores, but Norman (2010, p.7) notes that “parametric 
statistics can be used with Likert data…with no fear of ‘coming to the wrong conclusion’”. 
The models (indeed all of our analyses) are estimated in Stata v13, first by including the control 
variables and then sequentially, the independent variables. The primary variables utilised (in 
both types of analysis) are as follows. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Actual-Knowledge was based upon a set of five true/false questions for each of the four 
specific areas of the regulation (20 in total). As it is impossible to assess every single aspect of 
regulation in a manageable survey, the questions, detailed in Table 1, were developed using a 
number of sources, most notably The Pink Book (VisitEngland, 2012, 2014), with varying 
levels of complexity based on routine knowledge of regulations. Recognising the inherent 
                                                 
4 Given the dependent variables are the mean values derived from up to four areas of regulation (see Section 3.3.1) 
the values are non-integer, meaning that alternative methods, such as ordered-probit are problematic due to issues 
with data loss because of the required rounding and/or the resulting large number of cut-off points. Such 
alternatives have however, been explored in a variety of ways (including utilising rounded values, and categorised 
groupings) and the results are consistent with the ones presented herein. Simple aggregation of the results from 
the different areas of regulation was also explored (e.g. using the total number of correct responses) but this was 
found to be inherently biased since it treated individuals the same whether they had answered 20 or fewer 
questions. Thus, we report these OLS models because they are not only statistically valid but also because they 
utilise all our data variation and are the easiest to interpret.  
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potential for bias in basing this construct on a relatively small number of questions, they were 
written such that the correct responses were both true and false (across the survey), and some 
questions were framed to test up-to-date knowledge by presenting out-of-date information 
which was no longer true. To minimise the subjectivity of the questions and to ensure they 
gave equal treatment to the four areas of regulation, the questions were developed-with and 
approved-by the supporting trade-associations, and tested using the pilot study. A similar 
method for testing knowledge was successfully employed by Alaaeddine et al. (2013) and 
Blackburn and Hart (2002). The latter covered more areas of regulation, but did so using fewer 
questions per area (1-5) resulting with a similar total of questions (21).  
The ability of respondents to correctly answer these questions generates a 0-5 variable for each 
area of regulation. However, as the survey was structured to allow respondents to skip areas 
not relevant to them, the overall Actual-Knowledge of regulation was calculated as the 
percentage of questions correctly answered relative to the number attempted (i.e. X out of 20 
for those attempting all four areas, and X out of 15 for those doing 3 areas). A dummy variable 
(see Section 3.2.2) was included to control for any differences caused by not completing 
questions on all areas of regulation. 
Table 1 lists the mean percentage of correct responses, and associated standard deviations, for 
each question. Figure 1 demonstrates the distribution of responses, revealing there is a good 
range with an approximately normal distribution. Table 2 presents the correlation between 
Actual-Knowledge of each individual area of regulation against the overall Actual-Knowledge 
indicator. The strong and consistent correlations (row 5) demonstrate the overall indicator for 
Actual-Knowledge is not driven by one area alone, which suggests the measure is valid. 
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Table 1: Actual-Knowledge questions with mean percentage correct 
 
Employment 
Mean % 
Correct 
SD  Anti-Discrimination 
Mean % 
Correct 
SD 
From October 2014, the 
minimum hourly wage for 
someone over 21 is £6.50 
88 32.2  Firms are required to make 
reasonable changes for disabled 
customers 
94 24.2 
       
Full time staff can have 
payment in lieu of holidays 
46 49.9  Large single-sex groups may be 
refused service 
61 48.9 
       
Family members who work for 
the firm can be paid below 
minimum wage 
19 39.3  Customers may be refused 
service based on their age 
40 49.1 
       
If an employee is 'on call', they 
are only entitled to be paid for 
time when they are actually 
doing something for the 
business 
64 48.1  The onus is on disabled 
customers to highlight, rather 
than businesses to check for any 
special requirements 
70 45.7 
       
It is a civil offence to pay an 
entitled employee below 
minimum wage 
11 31.8  Properties with more than one 
storey should install an elevator 
for wheelchair users 
82 38.1 
       
Fire 
Mean % 
Correct 
SD  Health and Safety 
Mean % 
Correct 
SD 
A fire risk assessment is only 
required for medium and large 
organisations 
92 27.6  All businesses must appoint a 
health & safety officer 
54 49.9 
       
If no more than six people can 
be accommodated on the 
premises and all 
accommodation is not above 
the first floor (the six bed-space 
rule), then the business is 
exempt from fire regulations 
79 40.5  Employers are always liable 
when employees fail to follow 
safety instructions in the 
workplace 
44 49.6 
       
A fire risk assessment can only 
be written by a qualified 
assessor 
84 36.6  A health & safety inspector may 
enter any part of the premises at 
any time 
80 39.7 
       
An automatic fire-detection and 
alarm system must be installed 
in the premises 
71 45.6  Firms with five or more 
employees must have a written 
health & safety policy 
93 25.1 
       
All local fire service apply the 
same interpretation of the 
regulations and your potential 
risks 
 
43 49.5  Family businesses which are 
incorporated as limited 
companies do not need 
employers liability insurance 
97 18.3 
Note. The question stem before these statements read “from your knowledge of [each] regulation, is it strictly 
true or false that”. 
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Perceived-Knowledge was self-reported by respondents using a five-point Likert-scale for 
each area of regulation, based upon the work of Stokols et al. (2001) and Eva et al. (2004). As 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix for Actual-Knowledge 
 
  
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
1. Actual knowledge of  
health and safety 
 
-     
2. Actual knowledge of  
employment 
 
0.160* -    
3. Actual knowledge of  
anti-discrimination 
 
0.132* -0.075 -   
4. Actual knowledge of  
fire 
 
0.069 0.025 0.034 -  
5. Actual-Knowledge of  
regulation (overall) 
 
0.621* 0.563* 0.582* 0.589* - 
* p<.05      
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with Actual-Knowledge, respondents could skip areas of regulation not relevant to them. Hence 
Perceived-Knowledge of regulation was calculated as the mean response over all of the 
individual areas answered (e.g. someone answered 3/5, 3/5 and 4/5 for three areas of regulation 
would have a mean of 3.333/5). This was then converted into an overall percentage (3.333/5 
equates to 66.66%) to facilitate comparability with Actual-Knowledge. A dummy variable (see 
below) was again included to control for any differences caused by not answering for all areas 
of regulation. The distribution of responses is presented in Figure 1. As with Actual-
Knowledge, Table 3 presents the correlation between Perceived-Knowledge of each area of 
regulation against the overall indicator. Again, the strong and consistent correlations (row five) 
demonstrate the overall indicator is not driven by one area alone, and demonstrates the validity 
of the measure. 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix for Perceived-Knowledge 
 
  
1 
 
2 3 4 5 
1. Perceived knowledge of  
health and safety 
 
-     
2. Perceived knowledge of  
employment 
 
0.397* -    
3. Perceived knowledge of  
anti-discrimination 
 
0.488* 0.576* -   
4. Perceived knowledge of  
fire 
 
0.541* 0.404* 0.544* -  
5. Perceived-Knowledge of  
regulation (overall) 
 
0.777* 0.802* 0.855* 0.802* - 
* p<.05      
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3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Further questions were asked regarding respondent’s perceptions of regulation and control data 
regarding the respondents’ business, leading to the following variables to be used:  
Number of employees: a categorical variable (0/1) distinguishing between the number of 
people working in the firm, including the owner-manager. The base category (0) is 1 worker, 
indicating the owner-manager works alone, while category (1) designates 2-9 workers, which 
may indicate a family-based firm or one with employees. This distinguishes the smallest and 
least complex firms, from those who are larger and may fall under wider regulation. 
Years in business: a categorical variable (0/1) which indicates the number of years that the 
current owner-manager has operated the business, with 1-10 years (the base category, 0), and 
11+ years (cat 1). Fewer years in business may indicate the firm is new or expanding, while 
category 1 designates an established business and an owner-manager who is more experienced 
with regulatory issues and change (Carter et al., 2009). 
Serviced accommodation: a categorical (0/1) variable where 1 indicates serviced 
accommodation, while 0 indicates non-serviced accommodation. This designates the level of 
service provided and may impact the type of regulation and enforcement placed on each firm, 
along with inferring to which trade-associations each firm may be a member.  
Attitude toward regulation: the level of agreement (0-7) to the statement “it is important to 
me that my business is compliant with regulation.” This attitude informs the importance that 
owner-managers’ place on regulatory issues and on maintaining their level of knowledge to 
ensure compliance (Edwards et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008; IpsosMORI, 2007). 
All areas of regulation included: as the values of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge are 
determined by the mean score of up to four areas of regulation, this categorical variable 
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distinguishes between those who answered for all four areas (cat 1) and those who did not 
answer at least one area (cat 0). Forcing respondents to answer all areas creates bias as, for 
example, knowledge of employment regulations would be understandably lower for firms with 
no employees. This variable tests for any bias created by the different number of questions used 
to form the dependent variables.  
Number of trade-association memberships: there is a high-level of trade-association 
membership within the sample, and this variable is a count of the number of trade-association 
memberships, thereby serving to distinguish the level of engagement with trade-associations. 
More trade-association memberships offer more potential information sources and may also 
suggest more meaningful engagement with these organisations. 
 
3.4 Data Validation 
For the construct variable Perceived-Knowledge, which is based on Likert-scale questions, 
Cronbach's alpha was calculated to test for convergent validity and was found to exceed the 
accepted minimum of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2012). Since Actual-Knowledge is not based on Likert-
scale questions (and given the variation in individual test scores, see Table 1), Cronbach's alpha 
is not suitable. Face validity for Actual-Knowledge was satisfied by using a previously 
successful method of testing knowledge, though the specific content is obviously different 
(Hair, 1998; Hair et al., 2010). 
By collecting both dependent and independent variables from the same source, there is a risk 
of common method bias (Guide and Ketokivi, 2015; Podsakoff et al., 2011). However, the very 
nature of the study, exploring the perceptions and knowledge of micro-firm owner-managers 
means there is only one owner-manager per organisation, thus it is impossible to investigate 
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multiple individuals per firm. To mitigate this as far as is possible, we gathered independently 
sourced data on several variables, such as revenue, profit, number of employees, and number 
of rooms/pitches. These details were collected from sources including firm websites, trade 
publications, and financial data submitted to Companies House. This verification was done for 
14% of the survey responses (the maximum possible) and no evidence of bias or misreporting 
was found. Furthermore, through a pilot study we were able to assess the understanding of 
questions matched our expectations. Thus the validity of subjective assessments is accepted 
(Rong and Wilkinson, 2011). In addition, the survey was structured to separate key areas and 
reduce the risk of respondents linking different concepts. Finally, all respondents were assured 
of confidentiality and anonymity throughout the survey process to elicit truthful responses. 
With any econometric method there is an inherent risk of omitted variable bias (Hosman et al., 
2010), yet there is also considerable evidence that simply adding confounders will equally bias 
the model (Clarke, 2009; Hosman et al., 2010). We therefore followed the approach laid out 
by Clarke (2005) and Mitra and Washington (2012), whereby a review of the literature is used 
to suggest what variables may demonstrate a relationship with the dependent construct. In 
addition to the control variables included, we also tested other commonly used confounders, 
such as gender and region, which were found to be non-significant and have little association, 
thus they were not included in the study as Breiman (1992) and Clarke (2005) suggest fewer 
variables lead to more accurate models. Furthermore, our models are similar to those used by 
Blackburn and Hart (2002), whom include many of the same variables (albeit operationalised 
differently), culminating in similar R-squared results. Finally, in order to verify our models 
robustness, we examined the residuals and found them to be randomly distributed with no 
major deviation from normality (Pallant, 2011; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).  
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4. Results  
Table 4 presents the mean, standard deviation, and correlations for Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge, along with attitude towards regulation. Considering the range of questions used to 
develop Actual-Knowledge covered routine knowledge, we would expect informed owner-
managers to achieve close to 100%. Given Kane’s (2013) view that it is up to the test author to 
determine a measure of success, we would therefore suggest any score significantly below this 
identifies poor knowledge as it implies owner-managers were lacking a substantial amount of 
functional knowledge. A mean score of 65.92% (median of 67%) with standard deviation of 
12.13, and just 4.07% scoring 90% or more (see Figure 1), suggests respondents generally held 
a poor level of knowledge and hence H1 is supported (see Table 7 for a hypotheses summary). 
Moreover, the mean score for Perceived-Knowledge is 62.25% (median of 65%) with a 
standard deviation of 16.54, demonstrating owner-managers know they possess incomplete 
knowledge. 
 
Table 4 also provides support for H2, as there is only a very small correlation between 
Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge. This suggests owner-managers are generally quite 
inaccurate in assessing their level of knowledge (which can be further seen from the differences 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Independent Variables 
 
  
Mean 
 
SD 1 2 3 
1. Perceived-Knowledge of regulation 
 
62.25 16.54 -   
2. Actual-Knowledge of regulation 
 
65.92 12.13 0.096* -  
3. Attitude toward regulation 
 
5.97 1.09 0.260* 0.112* - 
* p<.05      
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in the distribution of Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge as illustrated in Figure 1). Finally, 
Table 4 demonstrates small but statistically significant correlations between attitude towards 
regulation and both Perceived-Knowledge and Actual-Knowledge, providing support for H3a 
and H3b. However, the coefficient with Perceived-Knowledge (0.260) is more than twice that 
with Actual-Knowledge (0.112).  
Table 5 presents the OLS regression models for Perceived-Knowledge, first with just the 
control variables, then (model 2) with all independent variables in place. Table 6 presents 
models for Actual-Knowledge. In both cases the models improve with the inclusion of the 
exploratory variables. These offer further support for H3a and H3b given the highly statistically 
significant, positive links between attitude and both Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, 
although as before, the coefficient with Perceived-Knowledge (3.82%) is greater than that with 
Actual-Knowledge (1.15%).  
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Table 5: OLS regression. Dependent variable: Perceived-Knowledge 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
  
 
(2) 
 
 
β SE t 
 
β SE t 
Intercept 
 
 
62.27*** 1.85 33.73 38.16*** 4.81 7.94 
Number of 
employees 
 
-4.10** 1.78 -2.30 -4.94** 1.87 -2.64 
Years in 
business 
 
0.85 1.48 0.58 0.88 1.56 0.56 
Serviced 
accommodation 
 
4.51** 1.61 2.80 3.76** 1.73 2.17 
All areas of 
regulation 
included 
 
3.25* 1.74 1.88 2.06 1.84 1.12 
Attitude toward 
regulation 
 
   3.82*** 0.71 5.41 
Number of 
trade-association 
memberships 
   1.39** 0.71 1.97 
       
R2 
 
 0.0442   0.1145  
Adjusted R2 
 
 0.0363   0.1016  
F (4, 484) 
 
 5.60***     
F (6, 412) 
 
    8.88***  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
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In the model for Perceived-Knowledge, there is a strong positive relationship with greater 
numbers of trade-association memberships. Every trade-association membership was 
associated with a 1.39% increase in Perceived-Knowledge. However, in the model for Actual-
 
Table 6: OLS regression. Dependent variable: Actual-Knowledge 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
 
(1) 
 
  
 
(2) 
 
 
β SE t 
 
β SE t 
Intercept 
 
 
69.89*** 1.36 51.40 62.67*** 3.56 17.42 
Number of 
employees 
 
-3.86** 1.32 -2.93 -3.21** 1.41 -2.28 
Years in 
business 
 
-4.10*** 1.09 -3.75 -2.81** 1.17 -2.39 
Serviced 
accommodation 
 
3.32** 1.18 2.81 4.32*** 1.30 3.32 
All areas of 
regulation 
included 
 
-0.66 1.27 -0.52 -0.23 1.38 -0.17 
Attitude toward 
regulation 
 
   1.15** 0.53 2.17 
Number of 
trade-association 
memberships 
   -0.57 0.53 -1.08 
       
R2 
 
 0.0669   0.0732  
Adjusted R2 
 
 0.0591   0.0597  
F (4, 484) 
 
 8.67***     
F (6, 412) 
 
    5.42***  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
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Knowledge the relationship is statistically insignificant. These findings do not verify the 
causality in such a relationship but suggest some support for H4a and H5, but not for H4b. 
The models also demonstrate a negative relationship for both Perceived- and Actual-
Knowledge with the number of employees, suggesting owner-managers with 2+ workers have 
(respectively) 4.94%/3.21% less regulatory knowledge. Furthermore, serviced accommodation 
firms appear to have higher Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge (3.76%/4.32%). Additionally, 
while the number of years in business has no statistically significant relationship with 
Perceived-Knowledge, there is a strong negative relationship with Actual-Knowledge  
(-2.81%). Finally, the variable to test whether all areas of regulation were answered by each 
respondent, is shown to be statistically insignificant for both models, lending even further 
credence to the validity of our chosen method. 
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Table 7: Summary of hypotheses 
 
H1 
 
Actual-Knowledge of regulation will be poor Supported 
H2 
 
 
There will be little/no correlation between Perceived- and 
Actual-Knowledge of regulation 
Supported 
H3a 
 
 
Perceived-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate  
with attitude towards regulation 
Supported 
H3b 
 
 
Actual-Knowledge of regulation will positively correlate with 
attitude towards regulation 
Supported 
H4a 
 
 
Membership of trade-associations will be positively associated 
with Perceived-Knowledge of regulation 
Supported 
H4b 
 
 
Membership of trade-associations will be positively associated 
with Actual-Knowledge of regulation 
Not supported 
H5 
 
 
Membership of trade-associations has a greater positive 
association with Perceived-, rather than Actual-Knowledge 
Supported 
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Table 8: Thematic review of unsolicited comments 
 
 
Theme 
 
Number of 
mentions 
Illustrative comments 
Trade-
association 
support 
14 Being part of a membership organisation probably makes me more aware of 
legislation and other issues, than independent operators (2016). 
 
Visit Britain have to reissue their Pink Book guide every year just to keep up 
with the continuous changes and additional restrictions (4031). 
 
I rely on the Caravan Club to guide me in matters regarding regulation of the 
Caravan Club site aspects of the business (5379). 
 
Firm size 
 
72 Our business is not only micro, it’s miniscule! (1910). 
 
Lack of 
support 
28 Local councils should issue booklets on fire and health and safety – not seen 
anyone or had contact in 18 years! (1855). 
 
Setting up and building a new campsite has been far more difficult than it 
should have been. Very little support from council and licencing authorities 
(3106). 
 
Poor regulator 
understanding 
7 Too many regs are designed for large business then applied to small/micro 
businesses i.e. turnover less than 100k. Phrase sledgehammer & nut come to 
mind. I with only 6 letting rooms have to comply to same rules as Holiday Inn 
& Hilton types of hotels (4653). 
 
Knowledge 
and burden 
 
87 Good practice in my bed & breakfast is followed as a matter of routine but a 
diary RE: hygiene is a waste of my time which I deeply resent, cooking only 4 
breakfasts max a day! (323). 
 
Regulations have a disproportionate impact on small businesses. Compliance 
sometimes has a very disruptive impact if you do the right thing e.g. maternity 
leave. We have no specialist resources to cover such things and nobody 
seems to appreciate that running a small business is like living in a turret 
with different types of regulator attacking from all sides (53). 
 
Feel many regulations designed across the board and do not always 'fit' to 
small business without incurring costs. Reduced my staff due to PAYE rules 
& regulations which meant more time on computer & away from hands on 
work (1963). 
 
I cannot pretend to spend my time trying to keep up with legislation. I 
understand that I should comply with the law and take reasonable effort to do 
so, however I rely more on treating customers as I would like to be treated 
(2142). 
 
The current situation is that there is so much legislation it is impossible to 
know & comply with all the regulations. Even specialist lawyers do not 
profess to know all the legislation in their specific fields and then refer to 
further 'specialists' (1570). 
 
Regulatory 
value 
 
18 I don’t think there are many businesses that don’t accept the need for certain 
regulations. Compliance of regulations is important but they do need to be 
made far more appropriate to micro businesses (2980). 
 
I believe that regulations are essential for the safety of the public (3804). 
 
Note: respondent ID in parentheses. Only themes relevant to this study are included here. The question stem 
read “is there anything else you would like to tell us about any of the issues raised in this survey?” 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge 
We found in micro-firms that Actual-Knowledge was poor in core areas of regulation, thereby 
extending the findings of previous literature which found similar results in (larger) small firms. 
Such a deficit of knowledge could, for example, be the difference between someone using 
safety equipment and someone else not even knowing it is available, and hence there is clear 
example of hubris with potential for negative impacts for firms, employees, and customers. 
Furthermore, the majority of respondents also identified Perceived-Knowledge as being 
considerably less than 100%, which is further suggestive of a wider notion of hubris in that 
owner-managers, by continuing to operate their firms, are knowingly acting with imperfect 
knowledge. As respondent 1570 put it: “there is so much legislation it is impossible to know 
and comply with all the regulations.” (Table 8, ‘knowledge and burden’). This implies that 
owner-managers are satisfied to continue operating their firms with limited efforts to rectify 
knowledge shortcomings. 
Since Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge only weakly correlate, our results suggest self-
assessment of regulatory knowledge to be a poor indicator of actual regulatory knowledge. 
This is not only in line with the majority of studies covered by Sitzmann et al’s (2010) review 
of self-assessment in general, but also casts doubt on micro-firm and/or regulation studies 
which rely on self-assessment. For the firm, poor self-assessment is likely to have a direct 
association with the ways in which owner-managers approach learning. If they believe their 
knowledge is ‘good enough’, they are unlikely to prioritise improving it, which suggests 
attempts at regulatory compliance will be based on a faulty understanding and knowledge 
deficits (and associated issues) will likely endure into the future.  
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In keeping with Edwards et al. (2003), Hart et al. (2008) and IpsosMORI (2007), we found 
attitude towards regulation has a positive association with knowledge. Moreover, since we 
unusually explored two measures of knowledge, our results show this association is markedly 
larger on Perceived- than Actual-Knowledge. The causality of this finding is unclear though, 
as knowledge might engender a positive view, or a positive disposition might encourage 
knowledge acquisition. In this regard, the unsolicited comments on the survey offer some 
insights (Table 8, ‘knowledge and burden’) as none supported the idea that knowledge 
engendered a positive view, and a number actively contradicted it. For instance, respondent 
1878 noted: “Good practice in my Bed & Breakfast is followed as a matter of routine but a 
diary RE: hygiene is a waste of my time which I deeply resent, cooking only 4 breakfasts max 
a day”. Such comments are not explicit support for a positive attitude encouraging knowledge, 
but imply such causality by undermining the alternative.  
The number of years in business was found to have no statistically significant association with 
Perceived-Knowledge, while having a negative link with Actual-Knowledge. Since our survey 
is not longitudinal, the effect of time on the knowledge levels of individual owner-managers is 
impossible to draw-out in detail. Carter et al. (2009) and Edwards et al. (2003) suggest the 
relationship with time is due to a resistance to change. However, the unsolicited survey 
comments (Table 8, ‘knowledge and burden’) hint at an alternative explanation: “I cannot 
pretend to spend my time trying to keep up with legislation. I understand that I should comply 
with the law and take reasonable effort to do, however I rely more on treating customers as I 
would like to be treated” (respondent:2142). It is possible Perceived-Knowledge remains 
broadly constant over time as past knowledge is assumed to be retained, but in the absence of 
significant continued learning, Actual-Knowledge declines as new regulations are 
developed/past knowledge is forgotten.  
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The negative relationship between both Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge with larger 
employee numbers is perhaps due to larger firms being busier, with the owner-manager 
spending more time supporting employees, leaving less time to allocate towards maintaining 
regulatory knowledge (as implied by comments relating to ‘firm size’, ‘knowledge and 
burden’, and ‘poor regulator understanding’, see Table 8).  
Serviced firms were associated with higher Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge relative to non-
serviced firms. A possible explanation is the serviced sector was subjected to a regulatory shock 
following the “worst UK hotel fire in 40 years” (BBC, 2011). This not only led to greater 
enforcement action but also the creation of at least two trade-associations, and hence likely 
engendered a more proactive regulatory mindset leading to a general increase in knowledge. 
Such a shock might also have exacerbated underlying differences due to non-serviced firms 
being subject to greater numbers of regulations because of the nature of their activities. 
 
5.2 Trade-Associations  
Given prior literature (and the lack of credible alternatives) we expected trade-associations to 
be a key source of regulatory knowledge, yet despite high levels of membership within the 
sample, Actual-Knowledge remained poor. Furthermore, while our results show that additional 
memberships have a small but positive association with Perceived-Knowledge (a 1.39% 
increase per additional trade-association membership), there is no statistically significant link 
with Actual-Knowledge. Yet, the survey comments suggest at least some owner-managers do 
rely on trade-associations support. Respondent 5379 for instance, offered: “I rely on the 
Caravan Club to guide me in matters regarding regulation of the Caravan Club site aspects of 
the business” (Table 8, ‘trade-association support’). This highlights the necessity of exploring 
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Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge independently, since a study of only self-assessed 
knowledge may have concluded that trade-associations are associated with ‘greater regulatory 
knowledge’ when in fact this only applies to Perceived- Knowledge. Furthermore, had we 
focused on a different potential source of knowledge, such as accountants, we may have drawn 
similar conclusions. 
We posit the lack of impact on Actual-Knowledge may be due to: information overload, with 
time constrained owner-managers struggling to keep up with the influx of regulatory 
information from multiple sources; contradictory information, with different trade-associations 
interpreting and presenting information in different ways; or from a false sense of security as 
access to information from multiple sources creates over-confidence, meaning it is not 
consumed/interpreted by the owner-manager. All of these possible explanations highlight the 
inherent lack of feedback because while trade-associations may provide detailed and accurate 
information on regulation (e.g. via the BH&HPA Journal), there is no recourse to ensure 
information is read, understood, and implemented. It also highlights there is limited opportunity 
to demonstrate to owner-managers that their knowledge is lacking and hence they must seek to 
improve it.  
It could be argued both Perceived-Knowledge and the number of trade-association 
memberships are in fact being influenced by a hitherto unexplored variable, such as the 
management style of the owner-manager; with more professional managers demonstrating 
greater Perceived-Knowledge and also choosing wider membership. However, this seems 
unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, we would expect such a professional management style to 
influence Actual- as well as Perceived-Knowledge, but our results found no such influence. 
Secondly, the ‘fire-fighting mentality’ (and the resource limitations) seen within micro-firms 
(Falta and Gallery, 2011), imply owner-managers are by necessity focused on day-to-day 
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operations, so have little time for professional development. Such constraints were highlighted 
by many unsolicited comments received in the survey (see Table 8, ‘regulatory burden’ and 
‘poor regulator understanding’). 
 
5.3 Improving Knowledge 
Having identified a disparity in owner-managers’ Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge, and an 
overall shortfall in both, it is clear that knowledge levels need to improve. Whilst this is a long-
term project requiring careful examination and further research, our results allow us to offer 
some preliminary insights.  
Improving regulatory knowledge will be difficult since micro-firm owner-managers are 
reluctant to seek support and shun outside ‘interference’ (Blackburn et al., 2015).   For instance, 
the survey comments suggest ‘official sources’, including government and regulators, could 
certainly better connect with firms (Table 8, ‘lack of support’). Unfortunately, there is 
considerable evidence that such measures (e.g. including ‘regulatory updates’ with tax returns) 
would fail as prior attempts have proven unsuccessful (Blackburn, 2012; Blackburn and Hart, 
2002).  The challenge (as with any source) is that owner-managers would need to read, 
correctly interpret, and implement any guidance provided.  However, Edwards et al. (2004) 
suggest they are likely to perceive it as ‘further burden’ and thus, ignore it. Furthermore, the 
ever-changing nature of government initiatives, such as the 2011/12 replacement of the popular 
BusinessLink (BRE, 2010), erodes owner-managers’ knowledge of how to access such support 
when desired. 
Our findings suggest three areas for future action. Firstly, calibrating owner-managers’ self-
assessment of their existing knowledge, thereby demonstrating the need for further training and 
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advice. However, while seminars and training sessions are an obvious start, micro-firms are 
reluctant to attend for a variety of reasons (Bennett and Robson, 1999a, b). A new approach is 
required which allows for remote learning and feedback. This could perhaps be achieved with 
tools such as case studies, quick-quizzes (e.g. in magazines), and incentives to participate (like 
prize draws). Additionally, given a preference for direct contact (BIS, 2016a, b; Peck et al., 
2012), follow-up phone calls could feature. Secondly, improving owner-managers’ attitude 
towards regulation, as this will improve the likelihood of enhanced learning. Finally, micro-
firms that are longer established and/or which have employees should be specially targeted, as 
they generally have the weakest knowledge levels. 
Micro-firms have previously been found to access support through accountants (e.g. BEIS, 
2016b), though as financial experts, they are not well placed to provide wider regulatory 
support on matters such as health and safety. Therefore, in the absence of credible alternatives 
and given the high levels of membership in the industry, along with what appears to be partial 
success in enhanced Perceived-Knowledge, we believe trade-associations may nevertheless 
present the best solution to improve knowledge of regulation among micro-firms, though 
further work needs to be done. Indeed, there is already evidence trade-associations currently 
provide “more concise and reader-friendly” guidance than the government (BRE, 2010, p.14). 
By enacting the suggestions above, particularly if an overarching trade-association, such as the 
Tourism Alliance, were to co-ordinate efforts to ensure consistency of information (Chittenden 
et al., 2002), all three of Peck et al’s (2012) aspects of information failure would be addressed 
by improving: the information available; the communication of that information; and 
knowledge acquisition (through perception and self-assessment). Furthermore, networking is 
known to shape owner-manager understanding (Kitching, 2016), thus networking with support 
firms, such as accountants, would also help to spread awareness of the tailored guidance, either 
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acting as an intermediary or by promoting trade-association membership (and the benefits 
therein).  
 
6. Conclusions 
Using newly collected primary data we have advanced our understanding of micro-firms, 
finding evidence that micro-firm owner-managers in the English tourism industry have an 
overall poor level of knowledge of four key area of regulations. Additionally, owner-managers’ 
Perceived-Knowledge of regulation was found to be poorly aligned with their level of Actual-
Knowledge. Such results suggest hubris is endemic within micro-firms, since owner-managers 
knowingly act with a knowledge deficit.  
Despite past evidence that micro-firms rely on trade-associations for support (for regulatory 
and other matters), multiple trade-association membership was found to be positively 
associated with Perceived-Knowledge, while demonstrating no relationship with Actual-
Knowledge. Nevertheless, in the absence of viable alternatives, we believe trade-associations 
remain a candidate to address the knowledge and self-assessment shortfall.  
The findings herein should have lasting implications for efforts to improve managerial 
knowledge and research in a number of fields. Self-assessment has been demonstrated to be 
inaccurate which calls into question the myriad of business related research which utilise it to 
assess knowledge or changes in knowledge. It is therefore necessary for future research to both 
shift towards tests of Actual-Knowledge and for greater research into how such testing may be 
implemented, as we accept that our method has limitations. We explored core areas of 
knowledge using wording agreed with the relevant trade-associations, but our results will be 
somewhat dependent on the particular wording and choice of regulation adopted.  
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There is still much research to be done in order to fully explore these issues.  Future studies 
using Actual-Knowledge might benefit from the creation of a standardised testing procedure, 
which would then help minimise use of inaccurate self-assessment. Such studies would also 
benefit from interviews with owner-managers, to better understand exactly how they receive 
and process information. This would help explain the causality in the relationships we have 
identified, explore the existing use of accountants, and examine how trade-association support 
improves Perceived-Knowledge but goes no further. Furthermore, the possibility that the 
disparity between Perceived- and Actual-Knowledge grows over time should be tested with a 
longitudinal study over a prolonged period. Finally, and in line with calls for greater research 
into trade-associations, we recommend their role in knowledge dissemination must be re-
evaluated. Such research might enhance their ability to successfully impart knowledge. For 
example, one possible explanation for the disparity we found, could be that trade-associations 
favour larger member firms (which our sample could not explore), as they have greater 
time/resources for association matters (Lawton et al., 2018).  Future research could explore 
this possibility. 
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